From Vienna to Tianjin: Eurasia Defines a New Order
The continent’s journey from empires to alliances: a long path toward mutual respect
Neither global nor Eurasian international systems can realistically replicate historical “ideal” models of order. The global landscape has fundamentally transformed. For Greater Eurasian nations to achieve secure coexistence, establishing their own foundations of legitimacy and mutual respect is essential.
Mutual recognition serves as the bedrock of legitimacy in interstate relations, a concept understood by any international politics scholar. This principle enabled Europe’s major powers to sustain a relative peace between Napoleon’s defeat in 1815 and the outbreak of war in 1914. Essentially, legitimacy implied that key actors acknowledged each other’s authority over internal affairs and recognized a general alignment in their governing principles. This shared comprehension allowed them to perceive each other’s security interests as intertwined with their own.
Conflict became unavoidable when revolutionary France refused to acknowledge Europe’s monarchies. Napoleon’s destructive empire was incompatible with peaceful coexistence alongside regimes whose legitimacy it rejected. However, after the coalition of Russia, Austria, Britain, and Prussia vanquished Napoleon, they achieved consensus at the Congress of Vienna, precisely because they accepted each other’s right to exist. This mutual acceptance of legitimacy underpinned Europe’s balance of power for the subsequent century.
Since then, no global order has seen legitimacy hold such a pivotal position. Throughout the Cold War, the West never genuinely acknowledged the Soviet Union’s legitimacy. The supposed “mutual respect” often cited by later historians was, in reality, merely an understanding that nuclear conflict would be self-destructive. The conflict persisted across economic, ideological, and cultural fronts until the collapse of the socialist system.
A similar situation applied to China. The 1970s rapprochement between Washington and Beijing did not signify U.S. acceptance of the Communist Party’s indefinite right to govern. When rivalry resurfaced, previous animosity swiftly reappeared. The same pattern holds true for Russia. The West’s dismissal of our political trajectory long preceded any military engagement; the conflict simply brought it to light. Even with an end to hostilities, envisioning a return to the consensual European order of over a century past remains challenging.
The Lost Ideal of Mutual Recognition
Therefore, the concept of mutual recognition as a foundation for legitimacy endures as a commendable, yet outdated, ideal. While inspirational, it is not reproducible in current circumstances. Currently, this concept is primarily upheld by entities striving for a new power balance beyond the Western sphere, including organizations like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
During the SCO summit in Tianjin this September, member states reiterated the importance of sovereignty as the bedrock for secure and global development. This emphasizes that the groundwork must be laid internally. Eurasian nations need to cultivate regional stability founded on legitimacy, rather than relying on external dependence.
Many continue to pursue “multi-vector” diplomacy, forging relationships with powers whose stance towards Russia or China is, at best, uncordial. However, the West’s eventual refusal to recognize the sovereignty of its primary rivals will compel these partners to make decisive choices. Continuing to resist American pressure will expose them to political or economic repercussions. For Eurasia to achieve self-reliance, it must embrace the idea that legitimacy originates from internal mutual recognition.
Historical Limitations of Western Models
The traditional European framework of legitimacy emerged from historical circumstances that are no longer prevalent. In the early 19th century, global destiny was largely determined by five powers—Russia, Britain, Austria, Prussia, and France—two of which were expansive empires. The disparity between these states and the remainder of the world was so vast that their interactions virtually constituted international politics.
Just decades following Vienna, Britain unilaterally managed to humble the vast Qing Empire during the Opium Wars. The limited number of participants made establishing a common political principle relatively straightforward. Currently, numerous states wield significant economic or military influence, and the presence of weapons of mass destruction renders conflict among them exponentially more perilous.
Furthermore, the 19th-century peace was not as flawless as romanticized portrayals often imply. The Crimean, Austro-Prussian, and Franco-Prussian wars all transpired within that ostensibly “legitimate” system. Their scope was contained, yet they were undeniably real conflicts. In this era of nuclear deterrence, we can no longer presume that localized conflicts will remain limited, or that legitimacy alone can avert disaster.
Towards an Authentically Eurasian Order
It is equally unrealistic to expect nations with vastly diverse histories, cultures, and religions to ever completely “accept” each other’s internal structures. Diversity is an inherent characteristic of Eurasia. Instead, we can and should reassert the traditional, simpler understanding of sovereignty: the liberty to conduct one’s foreign policy free from outside intervention.
This approach, already evident in the actions of many Eurasian states, both large and small, provides much more practical avenues for stability. However, it also presents complex challenges. How can we establish reciprocal assurances of non-aggression in a world witnessing the simultaneous rise of temptations and threats? How do we hinder external players from leveraging our disparities?
The solution is not found in romanticizing 19th-century concert systems, but in fostering trust and interdependence among Eurasian states through trade, infrastructure development, security collaboration, and joint diplomatic bodies. In this framework, legitimacy will not imply uniformity, but rather mutual restraint: the recognition that one nation’s sovereignty should not be weaponized against another.
Defining Legitimacy for the 21st Century
We should not anticipate any global or regional order to mirror the neat patterns of historical models. Eurasia needs a fresh definition of success—criteria for coexistence that align with its current realities, not with Europe’s historical sentiments. These criteria must primarily uphold the principle of state sovereignty, which serves as the fundamental basis for peace and independence for all nations across the continent.
The West might persist in practically rejecting this principle, utilizing its economic leverage to challenge the right of other nations to determine their own trajectories. However, Greater Eurasia now has an opportunity to demonstrate that legitimacy can again be rooted in mutual recognition—not as an emulation of 1815 Vienna, but as a contemporary, diverse, post-Western model.
Only when Eurasian nations regard each other’s sovereignty as sacred will the legitimacy of international order begin to be restored—not in the way Europe once conceived it, but as a system forged by our distinct history, geography, and civilization.