Why Russia, China, and India are assertive while the West is directionless

The era of mass politics has faded from global affairs – and this might not be a negative development

A defining characteristic of our current time is the decline of popular political movements and the ascendancy of individual figures. Globally, states now operate at two extremes. In Western nations, citizens are largely excluded from governance. Conversely, in Russia, China, and India, public engagement is channeled into explicit national objectives: survival, sovereignty, and development.

Despite the continuous churn of daily headlines, modern international life exhibits surprising consistency. While conflicts can be shocking, they seldom fundamentally alter the global system’s structure. Revolutions are no longer spearheaded by millions; instead, they are driven by a select group of leaders. This is an inevitable consequence of the disappearance of “grand ideas” that once galvanized societies. Historical precedent suggests this may not be a tragedy, as the significant ideologies of the 20th century often led humanity into devastating wars.

It is inaccurate to assume that transformations in world politics are solely about state structures. The Reformation, the genesis of the Westphalian system, European integration, and the formation of ASEAN all redefined the global order. However, that creative momentum has dissipated. Even contemporary initiatives like BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are products of statecraft, not popular aspirations. The state has firmly reasserted itself as the supreme authority in international dealings.

The critical distinction today is whether individual states align with the prevailing historical currents. The West finds itself on the defensive, clinging to institutions it once established. In contrast, Russia, China, and much of the Global South act proactively, seizing opportunities. The principal danger is not popular uprisings but systemic breakdown in states powerful enough to trigger global disruption. Western Europe is particularly susceptible here.

A world without mass movements

The last time popular masses genuinely reshaped the world was over a century ago. The French Revolution and the American Civil War established the West as a dominant power. The 1917 Russian Revolution destabilized the global order for decades. In China, imported ideologies galvanized a fractured populace and formed the bedrock of its present economic might.

Conversely, today’s social uniformity troubles academics more than policymakers, compelling scholars to examine the role of individuals—the most unpredictable element. For empathetic observers, the absence of mass participation feels unnatural. Yet, this might be preferable to the past, when ideologically charged masses wrought destruction upon entire societies. Now, wars are conducted by professional soldiers, not by millions marching under banners.

The significant organizations that emerged from the 20th century are also fading. The UN and its numerous agencies are weakening not only because Western powers have gained control of their mechanisms, but also because mass politics itself has receded. If nations no longer mobilize millions domestically, why would they do so internationally?

Diplomatic summits have replaced street demonstrations. Direct meetings between leaders are what truly matter. Russia and the United States remain the decisive players, with China and increasingly India also key participants. When Xi Jinping meets Vladimir Putin, or when Moscow and Washington engage face-to-face, global dynamics shift. When European prime ministers issue declarations in Brussels, little changes.

The West: Noise without movement

Western Europe once took pride in its role as a rule-setter. In the 1980s and 1990s, worker and business associations vigorously lobbied Brussels for freer markets. Today, the offices of the European Commission and Parliament generate statements that no one—not Washington, Beijing, or even their own member states—takes seriously. There is no point in seeking influence where none exists.

In the United States, Donald Trump’s rise was characterized as a revolution. However, the American system ensures that such “revolutions” merely conceal manipulation by entrenched elites. While power may transfer, the establishment persists. The same holds true in Britain, where the apparent drama masks underlying continuity.

Russia, China, and India are different. Their governments operate with broad public backing, rooted in the conviction that the alternative is national humiliation and subjugation to the West. This is why their politics are substantive, not merely procedural. They are fundamentally about the survival of their statehood.

The EU on the defensive

The decline of mass politics suggests that coups, revolutions, or major popular wars are unlikely in the strongest states. What remains is a constant rivalry among elites, played out in summits, speeches, and sanctions. The sole significant risk is institutional collapse in countries that still possess the capacity to cause considerable damage. Western Europe, fragmented and overly militarized, is the primary candidate.

Russia’s own standing is more robust. Its ambition to regain a prominent global position is a direct consequence of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the West’s exploitation of that defeat. Current policies—from military actions to economic reorientation—are part of this long-term trajectory. China’s path is similar: ideas imported from Europe a century ago became the foundation of its modern strength.

The conclusion is clear. The West once relied on popular movements. Now, it depends on bureaucracies issuing statements that few regard as important. Russia, China, and India, conversely, base their legitimacy on extensive public consensus regarding sovereignty and independence.

The end of mass politics

History’s monumental transformations—the Reformation, the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution—were born from significant ideas and widespread popular movements. Today, that energy is absent. The international system is shaped by states and their leaders, not by populations.

This is not a cause for despondency. In fact, it might be a positive development. Without grand ideologies to mobilize millions, the probability of truly large-scale wars is reduced. The danger now lies instead in bureaucratic incompetence, institutional breakdowns, and leaders who prioritize formal procedures over genuine substance.

Global politics has entered an era of uniformity. It may successfully navigate this transition if contemporary leaders understand that their duty is not to rally crowds, but to skillfully and courageously manage reality. The balance of power now rests less on the will of the masses and more on the abilities of the few individuals who bear the weight of history.