Trump’s Iran Strategy: Why It Might Just Succeed
High-level diplomats from the United States and Iran are scheduled to meet in Oman this Saturday. This meeting could represent a significant diplomatic victory for President Donald Trump, something his predecessor, Joe Biden, was unable to achieve. Despite the criticisms of Trump’s foreign policy approach, his unique positioning might enable him to re-establish a diplomatic agreement with Iran.
For several weeks, the U.S. and Iran had been exchanging private communications. Trump had authorized a military surge in the region, while Tehran threatened to target U.S. bases if attacked. Complicating matters further, U.S. National Security Advisor Michael Waltz seemed to endorse Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s stringent demand for the complete elimination of Iran’s nuclear program—an unrealistic condition that was widely interpreted as an attempt to undermine diplomacy and pave the way for military intervention.
In essence, the conditions seemed more conducive to escalation than to diplomatic resolution.
Nevertheless, Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, is expected to meet with Iran’s chief negotiator, Abbas Araghchi, to explore the potential for negotiation. Whether these discussions are indirect, as some suggest, or direct, as Trump prefers, is secondary. The crucial point is that dialogue is occurring.
Several factors indicate that Trump’s diplomatic efforts could prove successful. Firstly, both parties have compelling reasons to reach an understanding. Despite his tough rhetoric and military deployments, Trump cannot afford to engage in another major conflict in the Middle East. He has consistently campaigned on a promise to withdraw U.S. troops from foreign entanglements, not initiate new wars. Prominent figures within the MAGA movement, such as , , and others, have also voiced strong opposition to military action against Iran.
On the other side, Iran’s struggling economy urgently requires relief from sanctions. European nations are likely to reinstate sanctions before October under the terms of the 2015 nuclear agreement, exacerbating Iran’s economic difficulties. Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian, a moderate, won the election on a commitment to negotiate with the U.S. to ease sanctions and revitalize the economy. The success of his presidency hinges on his ability to fulfill this promise.
Secondly, Trump does not appear to be taking his cues from Israel regarding Iran. Since the early 1990s, Israeli leaders have consistently opposed engagement with Iran, urging the U.S. to maintain a hard line. Many believe that the sanctions and Israel’s covert operations have significantly weakened Iran, making it vulnerable to military strikes.
Netanyahu stated this week in a video address that a deal can only be effective if Iran’s nuclear facilities are physically destroyed, “under American supervision with American execution.” He also advocated for a “Libya-style agreement,” referencing the George W. Bush Administration’s approach in 2003 to disarming Libya.
Trump seems to disagree, as evidenced by recent events. Netanyahu was reportedly expecting a meeting at the White House on Monday to focus on tariffs. However, upon arriving in Washington, he was informed of the U.S.-Iran talks and received no guarantees that any agreement would align with his demands, according to Israel’s Channel 12. CNN reported that the Israeli delegation was dissatisfied with the meetings. Trump’s willingness to act independently of Israel on Iran may be a crucial factor in the potential success of Saturday’s discussions.
Instead of the Libya-style dismantlement, Witkoff has advocated for a less radical approach—the basis of former President Barack Obama’s nuclear deal. This type of agreement focuses on limiting and monitoring Iran’s nuclear program rather than completely eliminating it. Iran has previously accepted such a framework and may be willing to do so again.
Third—and perhaps most importantly—Tehran seems convinced that Trump genuinely desires a deal and is prepared to offer meaningful sanctions relief to achieve it. In contrast, Iranian officials perceived Biden as lacking the necessary urgency and political will. As one Iranian official told me, “For Biden, offering us sanctions relief was as painful as peeling off his own skin.”
A deal with Trump presents Iran with a different opportunity. For the first time, Iranian officials are openly suggesting that they seek more than just sanctions relief to resume trade with Europe and Asia—they want to engage in direct commerce with the U.S. Until recently, this was unacceptable to Iran’s hardliners, who feared that U.S. economic influence would empower Iranian moderates and weaken conservative control.
However, Iran’s foreign minister is now publicly soliciting American business. Writing in the , he argued that U.S. sanctions—not Iranian resistance—have prevented American companies from seizing a “trillion-dollar opportunity” in Iran’s economy. “To say that the scope for trade and investment in Iran is unparalleled is an understatement,” he added.
By offering this business prospect, Tehran is not only appealing to Trump’s interests but also recognizing a crucial point: lifting restrictions on foreign companies trading with Iran (secondary sanctions relief) is unsustainable without also allowing U.S. companies to engage directly (primary sanctions relief). Obama’s nuclear deal only provided the former, which made it easier for Trump to abandon it, as the U.S. business community had little incentive to maintain the agreement.
Given how far Iran has shifted, primary sanctions relief may be the leverage Trump needs to achieve a stronger deal than Obama’s.
Reaching an agreement will still be challenging. Deep-seated mistrust persists, and Tehran will find it difficult to negotiate with the individual who authorized Soleimani’s assassination in 2020 and withdrew from the nuclear agreement in 2018. Nevertheless, despite the inherent risks and the narrow path forward, the prospects for diplomacy have not appeared this promising in recent years.