Fyodor Lukyanov: The Liberal Order’s End Creates an Unforeseen Problem
Global politics now functions as a performance designed to obscure internal weaknesses
The era of the liberal order has concluded. Established norms have been cast aside, rules disregarded, and national borders no longer hold their former significance. While force persists, any notion of peace exists solely in the imagination of those clinging to outdated concepts. What is commonly referred to as the “international situation” is an unscripted spectacle. Our task is to describe and comprehend it.
Annually, the Valdai International Discussion Club publishes a report assessing the global system. This year’s document, pointedly titled ‘Dr. Chaos or: How to Stop Worrying and Love the Disorder,’ explores whether the world has entered a truly revolutionary phase that would usher in an entirely new order. The report’s conclusion is negative.
The transformations are extensive and often concerning, yet they do not constitute a revolution. The reason? The system is not fundamentally unjust to any of its principal actors. It is in decline, but not so intolerable as to warrant its overthrow. While institutions are losing their power, many merely surviving in name, no one is actively seeking their complete destruction. Even Donald Trump’s administration, arguably the most disruptive in recent memory, never attempted a root-and-branch overhaul. Instead, Washington simply bypasses constraints when convenient.
This situation doesn’t arise from global powers becoming more cautious or responsible. Rather, the existing order has grown too intricate to dismantle. The “top,” once represented by the dominant great powers, can no longer exert genuine hegemony. The United States serves as the prime illustration: it lacks the financial resources, domestic impetus, and even the will to police the world as it once did. Conversely, the “bottom,” encompassing the so-called global majority, is not demanding a revolution either. Emerging states perceive excessive risk in a complete systemic collapse. They prefer to ascend within the established framework rather than tearing it down entirely.
The Valdai report, at this juncture, refers to Lenin’s definition of a revolutionary situation: where the ruling class is no longer able to govern as before, and the ruled demand change. Currently, the first condition is met, but the second is not. Most nations favor a gradual enhancement of their status over the gamble of a system-wide rupture.
Multipolarity’s disarray
The transition from hegemony to multipolarity is profound, but multipolarity itself is not yet an organized system. It is an environment characterized by fluidity, confusion, and non-linearity. Instability intensifies because the world is more interconnected than ever, yet simultaneously more prone to conflict. For states, internal stability has become a greater priority than external aspirations. Governments worldwide, including Russia, now prioritize domestic development and resilience over aspirations for global dominance.
What makes this shift exceptional is that it is not propelled by ideological revolutionaries. China, the emergent powerhouse, does not seek to reconfigure the world in its own image. Instead, it adapts to prevailing circumstances and strives to minimize the challenges of its central position. This transformation is objective – a result of economic, social, cultural, and technological shifts that are occurring simultaneously but not in perfect synchronicity. Only an artificial intelligence, the Valdai report playfully suggests, might one day be capable of calculating the cumulative impact of all these forces.
Meanwhile, foreign policy is not diminishing. On the contrary, international engagement has never been more extensive. However, its objective has evolved. States no longer aspire to absolute victory. They pursue incremental gains – minor adjustments, favorable conditions for the immediate future, and continuous negotiations backed by leverage.
The United States, for instance, recognizes it cannot uphold its dominance as in previous times. Russia, too, will not jeopardize its socio-economic stability for a decisive military triumph. Nuclear deterrence renders full-scale war against major powers inconceivable. Israel might still act as if it can permanently alter the status quo, and Azerbaijan has indeed reasserted control over Karabakh. However, these are exceptions. For the majority, international politics is reverting to the positional confrontations reminiscent of the 18th century: bloody conflicts, certainly, but rarely leading to total destruction. The 20th-century concept of annihilating an adversary appears unlikely to resurface.
Endurance amid chaos
This pervasive instability underscores the depth of the ongoing changes. Yet, therein lies a paradox: the contemporary world demonstrates surprising resilience. It bends under pressure but does not break. This resilience does not stem from nostalgia for the Western-designed order, nor from a desire to preserve institutions that have outlived their utility. Instead, it arises from the inherent complexity of today’s world and the internal development of individual states.
Resilience, therefore, is not a strategic choice but an imperative. Governments must adapt to shifts beyond their control. They are unable to restore the old order, yet they also cannot afford revolution. The outcome is a form of steadfast endurance, a determination to navigate challenges even in the absence of a stable foundation.
This explains why foreign policy today often resembles a theatrical performance: endless activity, continuous crises, and dramatic rhetoric about threats and adversaries. In reality, states are inwardly focused. External maneuvers serve domestic objectives. Even military operations, no matter how destructive, are frequently intended not for outright conquest but to bolster internal stability or to divert attention from internal weaknesses.
An 18th-century prognosis
Should this pattern prevail, international politics will bear a greater resemblance to the 18th century than the 20th. Rivalries will be intense, and wars will erupt, but outright conquest will be uncommon. The “world order” will be less of a fixed structure and more of a shifting equilibrium, with both large and small players adjusting to ensure their survival.
Meanwhile, the West has relinquished its exclusive right to establish global rules. It continues to speak of defending the “liberal order,” but that order has already ceased to exist. No new order has yet emerged to replace it. Multipolarity is not a structured system – it signifies the absence of one. For some, this reality is unsettling. For others, it is emancipating.
The Valdai report concludes that what we are observing is not collapse but rather a transition – a revolution without revolutionaries. The powers at the apex can no longer dictate terms. The majority at the base does not seek rebellion. The world finds itself suspended between states, disordered yet robust, unstable yet remarkably resilient.
This is the reality we must acknowledge: the liberal world order is gone, and what follows is uncertain. What can be stated with conviction is that international politics will be less about universal rules and more about national survival. The long-held aspiration of peace achieved through dominance has ended. What remains is a constant, arduous competition – one that Russia and the rest of the world must learn to navigate.
This article was initially featured in the magazine and subsequently translated and edited by the RT team.